Proceedings of the First International Conference on Information Science and Electronic Technology

Modification of Edon80 to Resist the Key Recovery Attack

Authors
Xiaomei Wang, Yunqing Xu
Corresponding Author
Xiaomei Wang
Available Online March 2015.
DOI
10.2991/iset-15.2015.2How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Stream cipher, Edon80, Key recovery attack, Quasigroup, Latin square
Abstract

Edon80 is a hardware binary additive synchronous stream cipher submitted to the last phase of the eSTREAM project. The core of the cipher consists of quasigroup string e-transformations and it employs four quasigroups of order 4. The internal structure of Edon80 is highly pipelined, making it scalable from the speed of processing point of view. The best attack on Edon80 is the key recovery attack given by Johansson and Hell. In this paper, we give a modification to the Keystream Mode of Edon80 to resist the key recovery attack, and the modification keep the high parallelizability of Edon80.

Copyright
© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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Volume Title
Proceedings of the First International Conference on Information Science and Electronic Technology
Series
Advances in Computer Science Research
Publication Date
March 2015
ISBN
10.2991/iset-15.2015.2
ISSN
2352-538X
DOI
10.2991/iset-15.2015.2How to use a DOI?
Copyright
© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Xiaomei Wang
AU  - Yunqing Xu
PY  - 2015/03
DA  - 2015/03
TI  - Modification of Edon80 to Resist the Key Recovery Attack
BT  - Proceedings of the First International Conference on Information Science and Electronic Technology
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 5
EP  - 8
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/iset-15.2015.2
DO  - 10.2991/iset-15.2015.2
ID  - Wang2015/03
ER  -