A Forgery Attack on Leaked-State Authenticated Encryption

DOI

10.2991/esac-15.2015.32How to use a DOI?

Keywords

CASESAR, LAC, Birthday paradox, Leaked-State authenticated encryption, forgery attack

Abstract

The CAESAR competition is launched in 2013 which aims to find some authenticated encryption with good security and performance. Among these submissions, LAC is designed in a unique way with leaked-state structure. In this paper, based on birthday paradox,we find a forgery attack on LAC in nonce-misused case with time complexity 228. Moreover, we generalize the attack on normal version of leaked-state authenticated encryption and conclude some suggestions on how to use such structure.

Copyright

© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Jieshen Mao
AU  - Daoguang Mu
AU  - Xuejia Lai
PY  - 2015/08
DA  - 2015/08
TI  - A Forgery Attack on Leaked-State Authenticated Encryption
BT  - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Electronic Science and Automation Control
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 128
EP  - 131
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/esac-15.2015.32
DO  - 10.2991/esac-15.2015.32
ID  - Mao2015/08
ER  -