A Refined Simple Power Analysis Attack on ECC with Countermeasures
- Lihui Wang, Qing Li, Zhimin Zhang, Weijun Shan, Davidwei Zhang
- Corresponding Author
- Lihui Wang
Available Online March 2015.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/iset-15.2015.29How to use a DOI?
- ECC, Cryptography, SPA, Scalar multiplication
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is becoming widely deployed in embedded cryptographic devices. However, simple power analysis (SPA) attacks may retrieve secret keys by exploiting the power consumption of ECC devices. To resist the SPA attack there appear a number of countermeasures and the most widely used methods are Montgomery ladder and double-and-add-always algorithm. This paper proposes a refined simple power analysis attack to these countermeasures. Experimental results on smart cards demonstrate that this attack method can retrieve secret keys by distinguishing the power consumption of different jump instructions if the implementation of ECC’s countermeasure is not carefully designed. The experiments also demonstrate that the proposed countermeasure in this paper can resist this kind of SPA attack.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Lihui Wang AU - Qing Li AU - Zhimin Zhang AU - Weijun Shan AU - Davidwei Zhang PY - 2015/03 DA - 2015/03 TI - A Refined Simple Power Analysis Attack on ECC with Countermeasures BT - First International Conference on Information Science and Electronic Technology (ISET 2015) PB - Atlantis Press SN - 2352-538X UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/iset-15.2015.29 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/iset-15.2015.29 ID - Wang2015/03 ER -