Research of Reverse Supply Chain Coordination under Asymmetric Information

DOI

10.2991/seiem-16.2016.8How to use a DOI?

Keywords

reverse supply chain, remanufacturing, coordination contract, information asymmetry

Abstract

To promote recovery activities, this paper discusses a contract coordination problem by use of game theory, in a reverse supply chain under the guidance of government. Specifically, we present a nonlinear revenue function and consider enterprises' different risk preferences. We analyse collecting effort level, the degree of premium and penalty, minimum return rate, total profits and show how these change with the system parameters. Results show joint investment contract is more effective than shared-saving contract, considering information asymmetry and remanufacturer being the Stackelberg leader. Under the situation of information symmetry or using shared-saving contract, if the total system profitability keeps fixed, changes in profitability of two players have no effect on the system performance. But if remanufacturer has a stronger profitability than collector, the system performance would be better in the condition of adopting joint investment contract. The subsidy of the government can promote the development of remanufacturing industry; while effectively reduce the cost of disposing the waste products.

Copyright

© 2016, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Ruxiu Zhang
PY  - 2016/12
DA  - 2016/12
TI  - Research of Reverse Supply Chain Coordination under Asymmetric Information
BT  - Proceedings of the 2016 International Seminar on Education Innovation and Economic Management (SEIEM 2016)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 33
EP  - 37
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/seiem-16.2016.8
DO  - 10.2991/seiem-16.2016.8
ID  - Zhang2016/12
ER  -