Incentive Contract Design for Online Supply Chain Finance
Xiang Tu, Qifeng Yang, Ping Song
Available Online October 2018.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/icpel-18.2018.59How to use a DOI?
- online supply chain finance, incentive contract, principal-agent theory, incentive mechanism
- As a financial model innovation, online supply chain finance is undergoing changes in its financing model, credit model and organizational structure. As the dominant party varies, banks are not necessarily the dominant party in financial transactions. Changes took place in the original principal-agent relationship. In the new model, how to design contractual relationships among financial participants becomes an urgent issue to solve. This paper studied the principal-agent relationship between the platform and the bank in the new financial model with the non-financial institution as the dominant party, and the optimization and design of the incentive contract of the financial partner. It offers new ideas to effectively control the credit risk of online supply chain finance.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Xiang Tu AU - Qifeng Yang AU - Ping Song PY - 2018/10 DA - 2018/10 TI - Incentive Contract Design for Online Supply Chain Finance BT - 2018 3rd International Conference on Politics, Economics and Law (ICPEL 2018) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 256 EP - 259 SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/icpel-18.2018.59 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/icpel-18.2018.59 ID - Tu2018/10 ER -