Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model of Financialization Governance: Based on Equity Pledge

DOI

10.2991/978-2-38476-092-3_230How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Financial governance; Evolutionary game; Equity pledge

Abstract

In order to deal with the problem of excessive allocation of financial assets after equity pledge of controlling shareholders, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of financial regulatory authorities, controlling shareholders and non-controlling major shareholders. The evolutionary stability of strategy selection of the three stakeholders is analyzed by using the replicated dynamic equation, and the relevant parameters are simulated. The research results can provide theoretical guidance for the financial governance after equity pledge.

Copyright

© 2023 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Shuhan Hu
AU  - Lina Liu
PY  - 2023
DA  - 2023/09/09
TI  - Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model of Financialization Governance: Based on Equity Pledge
BT  - Proceedings of the 2023 9th International Conference on Humanities and Social Science Research (ICHSSR 2023)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1796
EP  - 1803
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-2-38476-092-3_230
DO  - 10.2991/978-2-38476-092-3_230
ID  - Hu2023
ER  -