Explanation for Real Estate Speculative Bubbles Using Game Theory
These authors contributed equally.
- DOI
- 10.2991/aebmr.k.220307.018How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Real estate; Speculative bubbles; Game theory; Equilibrium
- Abstract
It is well-established that the real estate markets in different countries were under different conditions depending on the nation’s policies. This research aims to determine the dominant strategy and the strategic belief for both developers and homebuyers in the Chinese real estate market. The market was classified into two conditions (rational exuberance and irrational exuberance) and was analyzed using a “dynamic game of incomplete information” model. The probability of beliefs was calculated using the posterior belief. The result showed the developer’s dominant strategy is to raise the price in a rational exuberance market whereas the homebuyer’s dominant strategy is to stabilize the demand in an irrational exuberance market. According to the perfect Bayesian equilibrium found in the game model, the results also proved that both developer’s and the homebuyer’s strategic beliefs have relied on the other’s income and belief.
- Copyright
- © 2022 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press International B.V.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Xinran Li AU - Sitong Liu AU - Dahe Zhang AU - Haoyuan Zhu PY - 2022 DA - 2022/03/26 TI - Explanation for Real Estate Speculative Bubbles Using Game Theory BT - Proceedings of the 2022 7th International Conference on Financial Innovation and Economic Development (ICFIED 2022) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 112 EP - 117 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.220307.018 DO - 10.2991/aebmr.k.220307.018 ID - Li2022 ER -