A China Case Study on Big Shareholders' Propping and Tunneling

DOI

10.2991/emim-18.2018.11How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Corporate Governance; Big Shareholders; Controlled Supportive Behavior; Tunnel Behavior

Abstract

This paper, with the help of China Top Software Company case, have analyzed both the motivation and implement approaches of propping and tunneling actualized by big shareholders of China's listed companies. Propping and tunneling both are main shareholders' behavior of transferring benefits in different directions in order to maximize their own benefits, the propping aims at raise the performance targets of listed companies, and that tunneling, which usually does not have an effect on the current performance but which causes a long-term harm to company's value and minority shareholders' interests, aims to transfer actual resources to main shareholders.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Download article (PDF)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Tangmei Yuan
PY  - 2018/08
DA  - 2018/08
TI  - A China Case Study on Big Shareholders' Propping and Tunneling
BT  - Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Education, Management, Information and Management Society (EMIM 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 47
EP  - 53
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/emim-18.2018.11
DO  - 10.2991/emim-18.2018.11
ID  - Yuan2018/08
ER  -