A Supervision Model for Senior Managers of Public State-Owned Enterprises

DOI

10.2991/saeme-18.2018.60How to use a DOI?

Keywords

State-owned enterprises, Principal-agent theory, Supervision and constraint, Multitask model.

Abstract

Under the modern enterprise system, the owner and the manager of a company are different people, which leads to the problems such as inconsistent goals and asymmetric information between the two, further resulting in principal-agent issues. In state-owned enterprises, in particular, the principal-agent problem is more serious due to the absence of not only their owners but also the monitors. By establishing the principal-agent model, we discuss the supervision and constraint issue of state-owned enterprises in carrying out social tasks. We first set up an optimal supervision model for the principals. Then, we discuss the influence of information symmetry on supervision, propose an incentive-supervision equilibrium model, and substitute incentive with supervision. Finally, in view of the observability of the task, we draw lessons from the incentive-supervision mode on the products and services of non-profit sectors in western countries, and put forward effective suggestions for evaluating and monitoring public SOE.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Download article (PDF)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Yuqiao Li
AU  - Yiwen Yin
AU  - Yanan Wang
PY  - 2018/06
DA  - 2018/06
TI  - A Supervision Model for Senior Managers of Public State-Owned Enterprises
BT  - Proceedings of the 2018 International Conference on Sports, Arts, Education and Management Engineering (SAEME 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 314
EP  - 320
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/saeme-18.2018.60
DO  - 10.2991/saeme-18.2018.60
ID  - Li2018/06
ER  -