How Chief Financial Officer’s Social Networks Reduce Corporate Misconduct: Evidence from China
- DOI
- 10.2991/978-94-6463-542-3_76How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Firm misconducts; CFO; Interlocking network; Network centrality
- Abstract
Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2022, this paper exhaustively analyzes the impact of the CFO social network on firm misconduct and its internal mechanism. The empirical results show that the role of CFOs is very significant, and the higher their centrality, the fewer firm misconducts. Several tests, such as PSM regression have rigorously verified this observation. Further mediation tests find that CFO social networks have information and resource paths that strongly curb firm misconduct. The research results of this paper not only enrich the theory of social networks and corporate misconduct but also provide a new perspective for the supervision of the capital market. The firm should pay attention to the construction of the CFO’s social network, strengthen its central position, and play its effect in preventing the occurrence of corporate violations.
- Copyright
- © 2024 The Author(s)
- Open Access
- Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Xuemei Qiu PY - 2024 DA - 2024/10/15 TI - How Chief Financial Officer’s Social Networks Reduce Corporate Misconduct: Evidence from China BT - Proceedings of the 2024 2nd International Conference on Management Innovation and Economy Development (MIED 2024) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 661 EP - 669 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-542-3_76 DO - 10.2991/978-94-6463-542-3_76 ID - Qiu2024 ER -