The Dynamic Game Analysis of the Civil Servant Corruption and Government Supervision

DOI

10.2991/meici-15.2015.273How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Corruption; Dynamic game; Costs; Expected returns; Nash Equilibrium

Abstract

In recent years,with the rapid development of network information,the ways of people contacting and paying attention to the political news are more much and available.The corruption has become a focus problem of the society,and numerous official corruption also frequently reported through the media.Considering the huge damage to the government and the society, the central government also pay more attention to the anti-corruption work, and promote anti-corruption.To the problem of civil servants corruption, this paper uses the method of dynamic game and analyses the two civil servants and government’s costs and expected returns in the process of civil servants corruption,Nash equilibrium of the main benefit maximization. According to the basic conclusions,we put forward the policy suggestion of the prevention of corruption to echo government work better and purify officialdom atmosphere.

Copyright

© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Nannan Shan
PY  - 2015/06
DA  - 2015/06
TI  - The Dynamic Game Analysis of the Civil Servant Corruption and Government Supervision
BT  - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Management, Education, Information and Control
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1569
EP  - 1574
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/meici-15.2015.273
DO  - 10.2991/meici-15.2015.273
ID  - Shan2015/06
ER  -