Difficulty of cooperation in iterated multi-Prisoner's Dilemma situation-Experimental evidence-
Kazuhito Ogawa 0, Tetsuya Kawamura, Tatsuya Kikutani, Sobei H. Oda
0Hiroshima City University
Available Online October 2006.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/jcis.2006.322How to use a DOI?
- multi-contact, experimental economics, channel reduction, cooperation induction
- Using the laboratory experiment and simple multi–Prisoner’s dilemma model, this paper explores the effect of the change in the number of contacts and in the contact (payoff) structure, and then the characteristics of the strategy that leads players to reach mutual cooperation. When the number of contacts increases from one to two, players face with the more complicated situation and their behavior may be different from the single contact. The change of payoff structure will also affect their behavior. In fact, most of the subjects under multi contact who reached mutual cooperation adopted the "channel reduction and cooperation induction" strategy and dealt with the complicated situation. This strategy is similar to the GRIT strategy used for the resolution of the diplomatic problems.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Kazuhito Ogawa AU - Tetsuya Kawamura AU - Tatsuya Kikutani AU - Sobei H. Oda PY - 2006/10 DA - 2006/10 TI - Difficulty of cooperation in iterated multi-Prisoner's Dilemma situation-Experimental evidence- BT - 9th Joint International Conference on Information Sciences (JCIS-06) PB - Atlantis Press SN - 1951-6851 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/jcis.2006.322 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/jcis.2006.322 ID - Ogawa2006/10 ER -