Proceedings of 3rd International Symposium on Social Science (ISSS 2017)

CEO Turnover after Acquisitions: Are Self-interested Bidders Fired?

Authors
Xiang Ma, Weidong Xu
Corresponding Author
Xiang Ma
Available Online May 2017.
DOI
10.2991/isss-17.2017.86How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Mergers and acquisitions, CEO compensation, Agency problems, Corporate governance, CEO turnover.
Abstract

We examine the relation between the abnormal compensation acquirer chief executive officer (CEO) obtained and the probability of CEO turnover. Using a sample of 306 acquisitions made by Chinese listed firms during 2006 to 2010, we document a significant positive relation between the abnormal compensation changes and the likelihood of CEO turnover. Though CEO can extract substantial pecuniary benefits from acquisitions, large increases in abnormal compensation is a negative revelation of CEO preference, CEOs who make self-interested acquisitions are significantly more likely to be replaced within 5 years of the M&A completion.

Copyright
© 2017, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Download article (PDF)

Volume Title
Proceedings of 3rd International Symposium on Social Science (ISSS 2017)
Series
Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research
Publication Date
May 2017
ISBN
10.2991/isss-17.2017.86
ISSN
2352-5398
DOI
10.2991/isss-17.2017.86How to use a DOI?
Copyright
© 2017, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Xiang Ma
AU  - Weidong Xu
PY  - 2017/05
DA  - 2017/05
TI  - CEO Turnover after Acquisitions: Are Self-interested Bidders Fired?
BT  - Proceedings of 3rd International Symposium on Social Science (ISSS 2017)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 384
EP  - 390
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/isss-17.2017.86
DO  - 10.2991/isss-17.2017.86
ID  - Ma2017/05
ER  -