Proceedings of 3rd International Symposium on Social Science (ISSS 2017)

Product Line and Channel Structure Design with Responsive Pricing

Authors
Xiaolu Zuo
Corresponding Author
Xiaolu Zuo
Available Online May 2017.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/isss-17.2017.5How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Product line, channel structure, pricing; quality, game theory.
Abstract
This paper studies a manufacturer's product line and channel structure decisions when downstream channel(s) using holdback pricing strategy. Products have two quality levels: high quality and low quality, and the manufacturer has five product-channel strategies: (1) Duopoly channel with high quality products (); (2) Duopoly channel with low quality products (); (3) Duopoly channel with mixed quality products (); (4) Monopoly channel with high quality products (); (5) Monopoly channel with low quality products (). The product-channel is designed by making technology adoption and resource allocation decisions for the products. We characterize equilibrium quantity-pricing decisions of two channels and the optimal resource allocation decisions. We find that profit gap of different technology adoption strategies increases as market size raises. Product-channel strategy is influenced by the distribution of potential market demand to a large extent.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

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Proceedings
3rd International Symposium on Social Science (ISSS 2017)
Part of series
Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research
Publication Date
May 2017
ISBN
978-94-6252-341-8
ISSN
2352-5398
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/isss-17.2017.5How to use a DOI?
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Xiaolu Zuo
PY  - 2017/05
DA  - 2017/05
TI  - Product Line and Channel Structure Design with Responsive Pricing
BT  - 3rd International Symposium on Social Science (ISSS 2017)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 21
EP  - 27
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/isss-17.2017.5
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2991/isss-17.2017.5
ID  - Zuo2017/05
ER  -