Opportunity Costs, Leadership, and Cooperation in Strategic Alliances

DOI

10.2991/aebmr.k.200312.342How to use a DOI?

Abstract

This paper presents a model of behaviour in strategic alliances, the iterated assurance game model with an exit option. From the literature review and the derived model, several hypotheses are proposed and then tested using Wilcoxon rank sum tests. Data was collected from self-administered questionnaires sent to emails of manufacturing firms in Russia. Results show there is no leadership effect on cooperation in dyadic alliances. Results also show that firms with high opportunity costs are more cooperative than firms with low opportunity costs. These results corroborate previous theoretical findings but challenge previous studies in laboratory experiments. They also suggest new avenues for further research on alliance partners’ behaviour.

Copyright

© 2020, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - I S Kukaev
AU  - C JF Candido
AU  - A M Makarov
PY  - 2020
DA  - 2020/03/17
TI  - Opportunity Costs, Leadership, and Cooperation in Strategic Alliances
BT  - Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference "Far East Con" (ISCFEC 2020)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 2461
EP  - 2466
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200312.342
DO  - 10.2991/aebmr.k.200312.342
ID  - Kukaev2020
ER  -