Proceedings of the 2015 3rd International Conference on Machinery, Materials and Information Technology Applications

Attacker-Defender Signaling Game in Multi-Period Based on Technology Accumulation and Bayesian Learning

Authors
Xiaoyan Zhou, Jincai Huang, Guangquan Cheng
Corresponding Author
Xiaoyan Zhou
Available Online November 2015.
DOI
10.2991/icmmita-15.2015.282How to use a DOI?
Keywords
technology accumulation; signaling game; Bayesian learning; multi-period.
Abstract

The paper models an incorporated multi-period dynamic signaling game between one attacker and one defender with incomplete information. It is assumed that the defender of two types for high and low attribute properties pays attention to his innovation and development by accumulating technologies, while the attacker can choose to attack or to accumulate technology himself without knowing the defender type. By analogy to perfect Bayesian equilibrium for signaling games, to describe the process that attacker tries to capture useful information from the signals sent by the defender, we give a backward induction algorithm and a numerical example to disclose the equilibrium strategies when to accumulate or to attack in multiple periods by optimizing the payoffs.

Copyright
© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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Volume Title
Proceedings of the 2015 3rd International Conference on Machinery, Materials and Information Technology Applications
Series
Advances in Computer Science Research
Publication Date
November 2015
ISBN
10.2991/icmmita-15.2015.282
ISSN
2352-538X
DOI
10.2991/icmmita-15.2015.282How to use a DOI?
Copyright
© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Xiaoyan Zhou
AU  - Jincai Huang
AU  - Guangquan Cheng
PY  - 2015/11
DA  - 2015/11
TI  - Attacker-Defender Signaling Game in Multi-Period Based on Technology Accumulation and Bayesian Learning
BT  - Proceedings of the 2015 3rd International Conference on Machinery, Materials and Information Technology Applications
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1528
EP  - 1534
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icmmita-15.2015.282
DO  - 10.2991/icmmita-15.2015.282
ID  - Zhou2015/11
ER  -