Decentralized Power Allocation for Cooperative Cognitive Radio Networks Based on Game Theory

DOI

10.2991/icmit-16.2016.32How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Cooperative communication, cognitive radio networks, power allocation, cooperative game, Nash bargaining solution

Abstract

Current studies demonstrate that cooperative communication between secondary users (SUs) can improve spectrum diversity in cognitive radio (CR) networks. However, any selfish SU in decentralized networks will not help other SU relay information with its otherwise wasted spectrum holes for nothing because the extra energy consumption will limit its own performance. In this paper, we investigate decentralized power allocation for cooperative CR networks. In our system, SU transmitters have the ability to transmit their own data and relay information for each other. Both SU transmit-receive (T-R) pairs aim at achieving optimal performance by consuming the same amount of energy under the transmit power and the primary user (PU) interference constraints. This power allocation problem can be formulated as a bargaining game, and the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) method is utilized to solve this problem. Numerical simulations and comparisons are presented to illustrate that the NBS power allocation achieve better fairness compared with the maximal sum rate scheme. And the NBS power allocation is efficient in that both SU T-R pairs perform better than if they work independently.

Copyright

© 2016, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Yu Yang
PY  - 2016/04
DA  - 2016/04
TI  - Decentralized Power Allocation for Cooperative Cognitive Radio Networks Based on Game Theory
BT  - Proceedings of the 2016 3rd International Conference on Mechatronics and Information Technology
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 171
EP  - 177
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icmit-16.2016.32
DO  - 10.2991/icmit-16.2016.32
ID  - Yang2016/04
ER  -