Pricing Decision for a Supply Chain with Social-responsibility Concerned Retailer

DOI

10.2991/icmesd-17.2017.53How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Pricing decision, Corporate social responsibility, Stackelberg game, Governments' subsidies.

Abstract

This paper analyses the pricing decision of a single-manufacturer-single-retailer supply chain, where the retailer exhibits corporate social responsibility(CSR). One centralized and two decentralized game models(manufacturer-Stackelberg game and retailer-Stackelberg game) are built to examine the impact of undertaking(CSR) on the profitability of the supply chain members as well as the whole channel. It is found that no matter who dominates the channel, the retailer always suffers from CSR when it is a profit-maximizer. Our finding verifies that not only manufacturers but also the retailer would be not willing to take(CSR) unless governments' subsidies or market rewards can compensate them for doing so. Interestingly when social responsibility is concerned, we show that a dominate retailer will be best off by taking(CSR). Therefore, we suggest that a powerful retailer should offer to take(CSR) strategically and otherwise for a weak one.

Copyright

© 2017, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Wei-Min Ma
AU  - Yan-Li Cai
AU  - Rong Cheng
PY  - 2017/05
DA  - 2017/05
TI  - Pricing Decision for a Supply Chain with Social-responsibility Concerned Retailer
BT  - Proceedings of the 3rd Annual International Conference on Management, Economics and Social Development (ICMESD 17)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 278
EP  - 287
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icmesd-17.2017.53
DO  - 10.2991/icmesd-17.2017.53
ID  - Ma2017/05
ER  -