Game Analysis of the Post-Paris Agreement's Climate Policy
Sujun Shao, Zheng Rong
Available Online May 2018.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/ichssr-18.2018.70How to use a DOI?
- Paris Agreement; Climate Policy; Two-Level Game; Repeated Game
- The Paris Agreement is an important global agreement to cope with climate change. The withdrawal of the United States has made the implementation prospects of the Paris Agreement full of variables. This paper analyzes the post-Paris Agreement climate policy based on the two-level game theory and repeated game models. The trend of climate policy proves that the Paris Agreement will still be implemented due to its own advantages. However, if the objectives of the Paris Agreement to be fully realized, it is necessary to improve various laws and form effective constraints and incentive mechanisms.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Sujun Shao AU - Zheng Rong PY - 2018/05 DA - 2018/05 TI - Game Analysis of the Post-Paris Agreement's Climate Policy BT - 2018 4th International Conference on Humanities and Social Science Research (ICHSSR 2018) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 361 EP - 368 SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/ichssr-18.2018.70 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/ichssr-18.2018.70 ID - Shao2018/05 ER -