The ultimate holding company, corporate governance mechanism, and information transparency of listed companies

DOI

10.2991/icemeet-16.2017.124How to use a DOI?

Keywords

the ultimate controlling shareholders; Controlling shareholders encroach on; Information transparency; Corporate governance mechanism

Abstract

this article from the perspective of ultimate controlling shareholder characteristics and corporate governance mechanism, the building two-period dynamic behavior financial theory model and empirical study on the method of combining with time window of shenzhen in 2009-2013 data of listed companies as samples, to study the relations of ultimate controlling shareholder and corporate information transparency. Study found that: based on the control of the pursuit of self-interest, the ultimate controlling shareholders of listed companies in information manipulation, and as the controlling shareholder control with the increase of the degree of separation of cash flow right, this kind of information manipulation get intensified; On the contrary, raising the level of cash flow right, the improvement of company internal and external governance mechanism, is to some extent inhibited the excessive information manipulation, which increases the transparency of information.

Copyright

© 2017, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Zhi-wen Gong
AU  - An Xu
PY  - 2017/01
DA  - 2017/01
TI  - The ultimate holding company, corporate governance mechanism, and information transparency of listed companies
BT  - Proceedings of the 2016 2nd International Conference on Economics, Management Engineering and Education Technology (ICEMEET 2016)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 585
EP  - 590
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icemeet-16.2017.124
DO  - 10.2991/icemeet-16.2017.124
ID  - Gong2017/01
ER  -