Application of Game Theory in Carbon Trading Mechanism

DOI

10.2991/assehr.k.211209.188How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Game theory; Carbon trading; Economic model; Marginal analysis

Abstract

This paper organized the literature about the allocation of game theory in carbon emission trading by consulting relevant research of peer scholars. As a result, we found that the total amount of newly published papers about carbon trading has declined in recent years while the number of new papers about game theory is steadily increasing in the last decade, and there has been an unprecedented enthusiasm among Chinese scholars to research emission trading system (ETS). Furthermore, when it comes to specific core themes of studies, more than half of the literatures concentrated on the perspective of government, about one-third of the literatures emphasized the perspective of enterprises, and only less than ten per cent of literatures focused on the coordination between government and enterprises. By such a method, this study clarified the tendency of relevant research in the past decade. It came up with a general analysis about the application of game theory in carbon trading mechanisms. According to the analysis, we anticipated that research about game models of carbon trading between different countries or economies would be an extraordinarily valuable direction in the upcoming period.

Copyright

© 2021 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press International B.V.

Open Access

This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Feiyue Wang
AU  - Silun Wang
PY  - 2021
DA  - 2021/12/15
TI  - Application of Game Theory in Carbon Trading Mechanism
BT  - Proceedings of the 2021 3rd International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2021)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1158
EP  - 1163
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211209.188
DO  - 10.2991/assehr.k.211209.188
ID  - Wang2021
ER  -