The optimal emission reduction rate and price with carbon quota and manufacturer competition
- https://doi.org/10.2991/iceesd-18.2018.11How to use a DOI?
- Carbon quota; consumer environmental awareness; manufacturer competition; carbon emission rate
With environment quality decreases, consumer’s environmental awareness (CEA) increases and more and more manufacturers are willing to produce the product with low carbon emission. At the same time, government employs the carbon quota to stimulate the manufacturer to produce green product. This paper studies how CEA and carbon quota affect the carbon emission rates and prices of the products when there are two competitive manufacturers. We give the explicit expressions of the optimal carbon emission rates and prices and analyze the impact of the size of the manufacturer, the sensitivity of switchovers toward price and CEA. We find that (1) the optimal emission reduction rates increase with CEA and prices but decrease with the emission reduction cost coefficient; (2) manufacturers’ profits increase with the increase of the sensitivity of switchovers toward price, CEA and the total carbon quota; (3) manufacturers' retail prices, emission reduction rates and profits are equal when the manufacturers’ size are the same; When the sizes of two manufacturers are different, the larger the size of the manufacturer, the greater the profit.
- © 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Linghong Zhang AU - Hao Zhou AU - Wenxing Sun PY - 2018/05 DA - 2018/05 TI - The optimal emission reduction rate and price with carbon quota and manufacturer competition BT - Proceedings of the 2018 7th International Conference on Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development (ICEESD 2018) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 59 EP - 67 SN - 2352-5401 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/iceesd-18.2018.11 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/iceesd-18.2018.11 ID - Zhang2018/05 ER -