Research on the Screening Mechanism of State-owned Enterprises Managers
- DOI
- 10.2991/iccessh-18.2018.236How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- state-owned enterprises; selection mechanism; business performance; top manager
- Abstract
In research on China state-owned enterprise manager, the most important and core content is the selection mechanism of state-owned enterprise and incentive constraint mechanism. To study the incentive and restraint mechanism of top managers in China state-owned enterprises is inseparable from the selection mechanism. Through the establishment of more general screening model, polyarchy and hierarchy screening model, comparing the different structures of screening model on passing rate and average capability, providing suggestions to state-owned enterprise. This article focus on the screening structure and screening performance concluded that the polyarchy passing rate is better than hierarchy, but hierarchy managers’ average capability is higher than the polyarchy. Meanwhile, in the absence of a competitive labor market, hierarchy screening is seen as an internal labor market, more suitable for manager selection.
- Copyright
- © 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Yuqiao Li PY - 2018/07 DA - 2018/07 TI - Research on the Screening Mechanism of State-owned Enterprises Managers BT - Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Contemporary Education, Social Sciences and Humanities (ICCESSH 2018) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 1046 EP - 1050 SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/iccessh-18.2018.236 DO - 10.2991/iccessh-18.2018.236 ID - Li2018/07 ER -