Over-Investment & Regulatory Capture in China’s Transportation Industry

DOI

10.2991/gecss-14.2014.41How to use a DOI?

Keywords

transport network, over-investment, transfer barriers, regulatory cature

Abstract

To investigate the reason why consumers transfer from one transport network to another one is inconvenient in China while China has invested much in transportation infrastructure and suffer in conflict on its over-investment growth path, we considered the impact of infrastructure operators’ rent-seeking activities from asymmetrical information and cadres’ rank-order tournaments. We extended the framework of traditional economy growth theory by involving the mechanism between natural monopoly industries’ investment and regulation method, and concluded that the transfer barriers and regulatory capture emerges from collude between transport operators and cadres for seeking superiors government’ subsidies. The main solution is to minimize the opportunity of hidden cost information by regulatory agency reform and private operators introducing.

Copyright

© 2014, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Junlin Chen
AU  - Qian Shan
PY  - 2014/01
DA  - 2014/01
TI  - Over-Investment & Regulatory Capture in China’s Transportation Industry
BT  - Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Global Economy, Commerce and Service Science
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 158
EP  - 160
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/gecss-14.2014.41
DO  - 10.2991/gecss-14.2014.41
ID  - Chen2014/01
ER  -