Research on Prefabricated Building Promotion Based on Principal-Agent Theory

DOI

10.2991/febm-18.2018.76How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Prefabricated; A principal-agent; An incentive mechanism

Abstract

Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper establishes a model for the cost allocation of prefabricated building construction between the government and the construction units, and makes a quantitative analysis to determine the cost-sharing relationship of the participants; establishes a differential incentive mechanism for the government and construction units. It also gives suggestions and opinions on the government's practice of promoting prefabricated buildings.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Linlin Hu
PY  - 2018/12
DA  - 2018/12
TI  - Research on Prefabricated Building Promotion Based on Principal-Agent Theory
BT  - Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Economic and Business Management (FEBM 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 337
EP  - 340
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/febm-18.2018.76
DO  - 10.2991/febm-18.2018.76
ID  - Hu2018/12
ER  -