Modeling Confrontations in Complex Networks Based on Game Theory

DOI

10.2991/csece-18.2018.23How to use a DOI?

Keywords

complex networks; game theory; nash equilibriums; scale-free networks

Abstract

To fully understand the structure robustness of complex networks where confrontations of attackers and defenders happen, we build a game model which is a zero-sum game in simultaneous form. We assume that the attack and defense are only against the top-n vital nodes and evaluate the payoffs using the full information of the network. A mapping process is introduced which maps the probabilities of pure strategies onto nodes. The experimental results in random scale-free networks reveals that the attacker pay more emphasis on attacking the nodes with relatively small degrees while the defender allocates more resource to nodes which play a more important role in maintaining the connectivity of the network.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Yapeng Li
AU  - Jun Wu
PY  - 2018/02
DA  - 2018/02
TI  - Modeling Confrontations in Complex Networks Based on Game Theory
BT  - Proceedings of the 2018 International Conference on Computer Science, Electronics and Communication Engineering (CSECE 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 109
EP  - 112
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/csece-18.2018.23
DO  - 10.2991/csece-18.2018.23
ID  - Li2018/02
ER  -