Sequential Voting Models with Externalities

DOI

10.2991/sekeie-14.2014.4How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Component; Externalities; Strategy Voting; Sequential Voting; Borda rule; Prediction

Abstract

Voting is one of the important ways to solve the problem of collective decision-making. Previous work assumes that voters are only concerned about their own preference. However, in sequential voting, voters can see the results of voters who voted before them, such externalities naturally arise in sequential voting. This paper considers the externalities in sequential voting which use the traditional Borda counting rules. We establish a voting model to describe the voting strategies of sequential voting with externalities. In our prediction model, an agent will do a prediction in the case that he cannot bring change to the voting result no matter how he changes his preference order, under this circumstance, an agent will vote in accordance with his preference order. The voting model provides a theoretical reference for the actual situation of voting behavior.

Copyright

© 2014, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Xiaoqin Huang
AU  - Yiming He
AU  - Liang Li
AU  - Guoliang Liu
AU  - Wu Chen
PY  - 2014/03
DA  - 2014/03
TI  - Sequential Voting Models with Externalities
BT  - Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Software Engineering, Knowledge Engineering and Information Engineering (SEKEIE 2014)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 15
EP  - 18
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/sekeie-14.2014.4
DO  - 10.2991/sekeie-14.2014.4
ID  - Huang2014/03
ER  -