The Effect of Compensation Schemes, and Self-Efficacy on Slack Budgeting

DOI

10.2991/aebmr.k.200305.046How to use a DOI?

Keywords

slack budgeting, compensation schemes, self-efficacy, moral reasoning

Abstract

This study aims to examine the effect of compensation schemes, self efficacy and moral reasoning on slack budgeting. In this study the hypothesis is proposed that in the slack inducing compensation scheme the slack budgeting will be greater than using the truth inducing compensation scheme, then managers with low self efficacy will do slack budgeting compared to those with high self efficacy. The research design in this study was a quasi 2 x 2 laboratory experiment, with Accounting students who had sat in the 5th semester of Padang State University as lower level managers who participated in budgeting. The statistical method used to test the hypothesis is two-way ANOVA. This study provides results that the compensation scheme can affect slack budgeting actions, self efficacy has no effect on slack budgeting actions, and the interaction between slack inducing compensation schemes with low self efficacy has no effect on slack budgeting actions. The results of this study can contribute in the management accounting literature related to budgetary slack and its causal factors.

Copyright

© 2020, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Ade Elsa Betavia
AU  - Nayang Helmayunita
AU  - Mia Angelia Setiawan
PY  - 2020
DA  - 2020/03/10
TI  - The Effect of Compensation Schemes, and Self-Efficacy on Slack Budgeting
BT  - Proceedings of the 4th Padang International Conference on Education, Economics, Business and Accounting (PICEEBA-2 2019)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 8
EP  - 15
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200305.046
DO  - 10.2991/aebmr.k.200305.046
ID  - Betavia2020
ER  -