Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Management Science and Management Innovation

Game Analysis of the Internal Control Information Disclosure of Listed Companies Based on Incomplete Information

Authors
Xiu-Qing Zang, Ting-Ting Han, Juan Lv
Corresponding Author
Xiu-Qing Zang
Available Online June 2014.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/msmi-14.2014.1How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Internal control information, Listed companies, Certified public accountants, Regulators; Game analysis.
Abstract
The laws and regulations issued by our government, to a certain extent, ensure the authenticity and completeness of the internal control information of listed companies. And promote the listed companies developing and implementing a sound and effective internal control system, thus avoiding the occurrence of fraud. From the angle of game, the disclosure of internal control information is a process of game between stakeholders. In this context, we construct an incomplete information dynamic game model of listed companies, certified public accountants and regulators and solve it by backward induction method. Several suggestions are provided for regulating the internal control information disclosure of listed companies.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

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Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Xiu-Qing Zang
AU  - Ting-Ting Han
AU  - Juan Lv
PY  - 2014/06
DA  - 2014/06
TI  - Game Analysis of the Internal Control Information Disclosure of Listed Companies Based on Incomplete Information
BT  - Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Management Science and Management Innovation
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1
EP  - 7
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/msmi-14.2014.1
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2991/msmi-14.2014.1
ID  - Zang2014/06
ER  -