Reputation Mechanism in Multiphase Game to Control the Moral Hazard of Aging Service Supplier

DOI

10.2991/mmetss-16.2017.90How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Aging Service Supply Chain; multiphase game; reputation mechanism; moral hazard.

Abstract

Aging service supply chain is a new trend of aging service development. In the supply chain, aging service Integrator and aging service supplier create a principal-agent relationship, which usually leads to moral hazard problem. This paper studies the problem of controlling Aging Service Supplier to Moral Hazard in Multiphase Game. This paper presents the evolution rule of the Aging Service Supplier's reputation by analysis, therefore, the reputation's implicit effect on restraining the Aging Service Supplier's moral hazard is revealed. A strong reputation mechanism is proposed indeed. And analyze the critical condition when the mechanism can control the risk of moral hazard. Finally, the conclusion has carried on the numerical analysis.

Copyright

© 2017, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Zhiyong Zhang
AU  - Haiping Wu
AU  - Yongqiang Shi
PY  - 2017/02
DA  - 2017/02
TI  - Reputation Mechanism in Multiphase Game to Control the Moral Hazard of Aging Service Supplier
BT  - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Modern Management, Education Technology, and Social Science (MMETSS 2016)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/mmetss-16.2017.90
DO  - 10.2991/mmetss-16.2017.90
ID  - Zhang2017/02
ER  -