Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprise Lobbying Government from the Perspective of Environmental Tax
- 10.2991/ifeesm-17.2018.175How to use a DOI?
- Environmental tax; Polluting enterprises; Lobbying; Evolutionary game
Under the background of formulating environmental tax policy, the polluting enterprises will lobby the government legislative branch and try to lower the standard of environmental tax policy to maximize their own interests. In order to realize the real effect of environmental tax policy, effective measures should be taken to avoid collusion between government and enterprises. Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, the paper analyses the strategy set of government legislative branch and polluting enterprises in the process of environmental tax policy making, using evolutionary game model to construct the utility function and income matrix of both sides, and do evolution analysis and strategy adjustment of environmental governance target and the actual income of stakeholders. We will correct the original possible error behavior to make the system equilibrium in continuous evolution, and ultimately achieve the evolution of stability, thus obtained the game process and the selection of their evolutionary stability strategies in the environmental tax policy formulation.
- © 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Yazong Mai PY - 2018/02 DA - 2018/02 TI - Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprise Lobbying Government from the Perspective of Environmental Tax BT - Proceedings of the 2017 3rd International Forum on Energy, Environment Science and Materials (IFEESM 2017) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 933 EP - 939 SN - 2352-5401 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/ifeesm-17.2018.175 DO - 10.2991/ifeesm-17.2018.175 ID - Mai2018/02 ER -