Sustainability Investment of a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

DOI

10.2991/assehr.k.210407.045How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Cap-and-trade regulation, Sustainability investment, Stackelberg game, Consignment contract

Abstract

Taking into account the consumer has a low carbon preference, under the dual driving force of environment production and economic benefit, the manufacturer will invest in emission reduction technology in the upstream and downstream, such as introduce emission reduction equipment or cleaner production technology. We focus on a two-echelon sustainable supply chain that includes single manufacturer and single retailer. We explore how should manufacturer rationally choose the way of investment in emission reduction, i.e., whether the manufacturer should invest in both upstream and downstream or only in the upstream. Compared with the sustainable investment only in the upstream, investment in both upstream and downstream is more sustainable and profitable.

Copyright

© 2021, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Yuyu Chen
AU  - Jianfei Gu
PY  - 2021
DA  - 2021/04/08
TI  - Sustainability Investment of a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Cap-and-Trade Regulation
BT  - Proceedings of the 2021 6th International Conference on Social Sciences and Economic Development (ICSSED 2021)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 222
EP  - 226
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210407.045
DO  - 10.2991/assehr.k.210407.045
ID  - Chen2021
ER  -