The Sustainable Supply Chain Game Research of Joint Inventory Decisions Considering Fairness Concern

DOI

10.2991/978-94-6463-262-0_90How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Sustainable supply chain; Fairness concern; Stochastic demand; Dynamic games; Inventory decisions

Abstract

The deterioration of the natural environment has attracted the attention of a wide range of scholars, and there has been a gradual increase in research on sustainable supply chains. In this paper, we consider the supply chain of joint decision making for inventory and sustainability technology investment. First of all, increasing demand variability reduces the optimal profitability of the centralized supply chain. Second, in a fair concern manufacturer-dominated Stackelberg game model, equilibrium results are derived and it is shown that manufacturer will adopt more conservative measures. Finally, the above results are verified by Matlab calculation examples.

Copyright

© 2024 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Xuan Chen
PY  - 2023
DA  - 2023/10/09
TI  - The Sustainable Supply Chain Game Research of Joint Inventory Decisions Considering Fairness Concern
BT  - Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Management Science and Software Engineering (ICMSSE 2023)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 864
EP  - 871
SN  - 2589-4943
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-262-0_90
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6463-262-0_90
ID  - Chen2023
ER  -