Collaborative Innovation Contracting in Double Moral Hazard

DOI

10.2991/assehr.k.210519.124How to use a DOI?

Keywords

collaborative innovation, knowledge stickiness, double moral hazard, contract governance

Abstract

Under the background of innovation driven strategy in China, collaborative innovation can accelerate the speed of enterprise innovation and improve enterprise innovation performance. The key to collaborative innovation is effective contract governance. Due to the knowledge stickiness in collaborative innovation, the level of effort input of both sides cannot be confirmed and supervised without cost, and that results in double moral hazard. Based on the principal-agent model, this paper analyses the contract design of enterprise collaborative innovation under the condition of double moral hazard from two aspects of residual incentive payment and fixed payment. The conclusion shows that the residual incentive payment of the contract is negatively correlated with the knowledge stickiness of the cooperative innovation initiator enterprise, and the fixed payment of the contract is positively correlated with the knowledge stickiness of the cooperative innovation initiator enterprise.

Copyright

© 2021, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Hui-fen LI
PY  - 2021
DA  - 2021/05/20
TI  - Collaborative Innovation Contracting in Double Moral Hazard
BT  - Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Humanities and Social Science Research (ICHSSR 2021)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 634
EP  - 637
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210519.124
DO  - 10.2991/assehr.k.210519.124
ID  - LI2021
ER  -