Analysis on Evolutionary Game of Parking Standardization of Sharing Bike

DOI

10.2991/icesem-18.2018.92How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Sharing bike; Parking standardization; Evolutionary game; The government supervision; Enterprise management; Government supervision

Abstract

In order to solve the problem of parking standardization of sharing bike, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model for government and enterprises based on the current parking standardization of sharing bike, analyzes the stability of both parties, and reveals the effect of its stability. The research shows the following results: the government performance evaluation coefficient will not affect the behaviors of both parties; raising the standard of government regulation and strengthening government regulation will promote the strict enterprise management; it is conducive to strict government supervision by raising the standard of government regulation and intensifying punishment. The government should appropriately increase the punishment for non-strict governance of the enterprise and reduce its own supervision cost, so as to prevent the government and enterprise from falling into an infinite loop in policy selection.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Honghong Zhang
AU  - Hongzhen Lei
AU  - Juanli Lan
AU  - Chao Liu
PY  - 2018/08
DA  - 2018/08
TI  - Analysis on Evolutionary Game of Parking Standardization of Sharing Bike
BT  - Proceedings of the 2018 2nd International Conference on Education Science and Economic Management (ICESEM 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 403
EP  - 408
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icesem-18.2018.92
DO  - 10.2991/icesem-18.2018.92
ID  - Zhang2018/08
ER  -