Analysis of the Influence of Listed Companies' Share Arrangement on Business Performance

DOI

10.2991/icesem-18.2018.74How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Residual Rights of Control; Residual Claim; Non-human capital; Incentives

Abstract

At present, as an integral part of the market, the company is playing a more and more important role in the wave of economic globalization. Corporate decision makers, managers, and supervisors are particularly important in corporate competition. Regression analysis is conducted on panel data of shareholdings of general managers, senior managers, and supervisors. The correspondence between Residual Rights of Control and Residual Claim is important. That is, the board of directors, general manager, senior management personnel, and supervisors has shares that help improve the company's performance. At the same time, they are affected by corporate incentive goals and incentive mechanisms, but directors, general manager, senior management personnel, and supervisors should each have the number of shares that need to be optimized and discussed.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Xiaowei Zhou
AU  - Bowen Li
PY  - 2018/08
DA  - 2018/08
TI  - Analysis of the Influence of Listed Companies' Share Arrangement on Business Performance
BT  - Proceedings of the 2018 2nd International Conference on Education Science and Economic Management (ICESEM 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 324
EP  - 328
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icesem-18.2018.74
DO  - 10.2991/icesem-18.2018.74
ID  - Zhou2018/08
ER  -