The Effect of Executives’ Self-interested Selling on the Quality of Information Disclosure

From the Perspective of R&D Manipulation

DOI

10.2991/978-94-6463-368-9_47How to use a DOI?

Keywords

executives selling; opportunistic behaviors; information disclosure; R&D manipulation

Abstract

Based on the annual data of Chinese listed companies from 2008 to 2021, this paper employs a panel regression model to empirically examine the impact of executives’ opportunistic selling on the quality of information disclosure. The findings indicate that managers’ opportunistic selling significantly diminishes the quality of information disclosure. Moreover, R&D manipulation partially mediates the relationship between managers’ opportunistic selling and the quality of information disclosure, while enhancing internal control quality mitigates the adverse effects caused by managers’ opportunistic selling on the quality of information disclosure.

Copyright

© 2024 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Zhe Xu
PY  - 2024
DA  - 2024/02/14
TI  - The Effect of Executives’ Self-interested Selling on the Quality of Information Disclosure
BT  - Proceedings of the 2023 5th International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2023)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 405
EP  - 410
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-368-9_47
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6463-368-9_47
ID  - Xu2024
ER  -