Analysis on the Relation Between Stake Size Effect and Fehr-Schmidt’s Parameters

DOI

10.2991/assehr.k.211209.534How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Ultimatum Game; Game Theory; Fehr-Schmidt model; stake size; Inequity aversion

Abstract

Stake Size Effect demonstrates the phenomenon that in Ultimatum Game, individuals have much lower rejection rates when facing the same proportion of offers but with higher stake sizes. This article relates the Stake Size Effect with the Fehr-Schmidt model, which is one of the most important models in explaining the role of fairness in bargaining games. The author was interested in finding a simple relationship between stake size and parameters of inequity in the Fehr-Schmidt model. The model was first built based on data collected in Andersen et al.’s experiment by using linear regression technique and then checked with other empirical data[1]. Although the result shows a large difference between experiments as the effectiveness of the built model varies in a wide range, a rough trend between the change of log stake size and the change of log parameters can be seen.

Copyright

© 2021 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press International B.V.

Open Access

This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Jiaming Fan
PY  - 2021
DA  - 2021/12/15
TI  - Analysis on the Relation Between Stake Size Effect and Fehr-Schmidt’s Parameters
BT  - Proceedings of the 2021 3rd International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2021)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 3272
EP  - 3276
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211209.534
DO  - 10.2991/assehr.k.211209.534
ID  - Fan2021
ER  -