The Influence of Non-State-Owned Shareholders on Auditor Selection in Mixed Reform of State-Owned Enterprises

DOI

10.2991/aebmr.k.191217.083How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Mixed Reform of State-owned Enterprises, Auditor selection, Ownership structure

Abstract

The mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises is an important tendency of current and future reform of state-owned enterprises in China. Improving the corporate governance level of state-owned enterprises is one of important causes of the reformation. Considering the important role of auditing in corporate governance, this paper tests the influence of non-state-owned major shareholders on auditor selection of state-owned enterprises by using China’s A-share state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2017 as research samples. The study found that the participation of non-state-owned shareholders in the governance of state-owned enterprises increased the demand for high-quality audit. Further research shows that different administrative levels and industrial competition degree have no significant influence on non-state-owned shareholders' participation in state-owned enterprise’s corporate governance.

Copyright

© 2019, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Ping CHEN
PY  - 2019
DA  - 2019/12/20
TI  - The Influence of Non-State-Owned Shareholders on Auditor Selection in Mixed Reform of State-Owned Enterprises
BT  - Proceedings of the 2019 International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2019)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 468
EP  - 473
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.191217.083
DO  - 10.2991/aebmr.k.191217.083
ID  - CHEN2019
ER  -