Research on Managerial Self-interest and Corporate Donation

DOI

10.2991/icedem-19.2019.11How to use a DOI?

Keywords

managerial self-interest; corporate donation; the management; actual controller

Abstract

Corporate donation is not only influenced by the enterprise, but also driven by the managerial self-interest. Based on the data of Listed Companies in China from 2008 to 2017, this paper empirically examines the influence of managerial self-interest and actual controllers on corporate donations. The results show that the greater the power of management, the more corporate donations, while the existence of actual controllers can restrain the self-interest behavior of management, and alleviate the impact of agency costs on corporate donations.

Copyright

© 2019, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Furong Guo
AU  - Shengdao Gan
PY  - 2019/10
DA  - 2019/10
TI  - Research on Managerial Self-interest and Corporate Donation
BT  - Proceedings of the 2019 3rd International Conference on Economic Development and Education Management (ICEDEM 2019)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 44
EP  - 47
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icedem-19.2019.11
DO  - 10.2991/icedem-19.2019.11
ID  - Guo2019/10
ER  -