The Games between Central and Local Governments in the Newest Regulatory Policy of the Real Estate Market

DOI

10.2991/icassr.2013.39How to use a DOI?

Keywords

real estate market; government; mixed strategy Nash equilibrium model.

Abstract

Chinese central government has promulgated a series of policies and measures to regulate the real estate market to restrain the rapid increasing of the house price, but the effect seems unsatisfactory. This paper mainly aims at analyzing the origin of this issue by the game theory, thus we establish an Intergovernmental Static Nash Equilibrium model and a Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Model as well. Based on the final equilibrium point, we find that it’s the uneven interests’ distribution between central and local government which leads to the failure of the newest policy, and strengthening regulation and adjusting the structure of interests’ distribution can be efficient ways to solve the problem.

Copyright

© 2013, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Ming-li Gong
AU  - Han Jiang
PY  - 2013/08
DA  - 2013/08
TI  - The Games between Central and Local Governments in the Newest Regulatory Policy of the Real Estate Market
BT  - Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Applied Social Science Research (ICASSR-2013)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 138
EP  - 140
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icassr.2013.39
DO  - 10.2991/icassr.2013.39
ID  - Gong2013/08
ER  -