Game Analysis of Government and Shipping Company Considering Subsidies
- DOI
- 10.2991/978-94-6463-010-7_51How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Stackelberg game; low-sulfur fuel; government subsidy
- Abstract
In the context of the sulfur cap, the government’s adoption of different subsidy models will have an impact on shipping service pricing decisions. The Stackelberg game model between the government and the shipping company is established. The government aims at maximizing social welfare, and the shipping company aims at maximizing profit and analyzes and compares the two modes of government subsidizing the shipping company or the shipper. The results show that the same demand can be obtained for low-sulfur fuel oil shipping services under both subsidy models. The difference is that government subsidies to shipping companies can directly increase corporate profits. On the one hand, the increase in profits means that the demand for low-sulfur fuel oil shipping services will increase, and on the other hand, it will also help shipping companies continue to provide more low-sulfur fuel oil shipping services.
- Copyright
- © 2023 The Author(s)
- Open Access
- Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Lihaokun Liu AU - Yanping Meng PY - 2022 DA - 2022/12/02 TI - Game Analysis of Government and Shipping Company Considering Subsidies BT - Proceedings of the 2022 International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Internet and Digital Economy (ICAID 2022) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 481 EP - 491 SN - 2589-4919 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-010-7_51 DO - 10.2991/978-94-6463-010-7_51 ID - Liu2022 ER -