Research on Game Behavior of National Energy Security Risk Audit

Based on the Concept of Sustainable Development

DOI

10.2991/978-94-6463-415-0_66How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Game behavior; Sustainable development; National energy security risk audit

Abstract

The paper analyzes the behavioral characteristics of both parties in national auditing agencies and energy enterprises in safety risk auditing. Based on the basic assumption of rational economic factors, static game models and dynamic repeated game models are established, and the behavioral strategies of both parties in auditing under different conditions are obtained. This provides a reference basis for formulating scientific policy systems for national energy security risk auditing.

Copyright

© 2024 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Jiao Xu
AU  - Deng Xiao
AU  - Zhang Kan
AU  - Liu Sishi
AU  - Su Kai
PY  - 2024
DA  - 2024/05/14
TI  - Research on Game Behavior of National Energy Security Risk Audit
BT  - Proceedings of the 2023 9th International Conference on Advances in Energy Resources and Environment Engineering (ICAESEE 2023)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 619
EP  - 630
SN  - 2589-4943
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-415-0_66
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6463-415-0_66
ID  - Xu2024
ER  -