Scientific Incentive Mechanism of College English Teachers

DOI

10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.154How to use a DOI?

Keywords

institutional economics; incentive mechanism; scientific research; college English teachers; tenure system.

Abstract

Base on the principal-agent theories, this paper, from the angle of institutional economics, compares the optimal incentive contract on college English teachers under single-period moral hazard and under repeated moral hazard and introduces tenure contract in the model of repeated moral hazard. Our study finds the following results: (1) in the pre-tenure period under tenure contract with repeated moral hazard, the principal pays less to college English teachers to promote their incentive of hard-working in scientific research than in the case of single-period moral hazard; (2) college English teachers with tenure are much more difficult to be stimulated to work hard in scientific research and the college management layer has to pay much more to them for their hard work in academic field; (3) tenure system is cost-efficient in the pre-tenure period but is not necessarily cost-efficient in the tenure period.

Copyright

© 2013, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Xiaofang Zhang
AU  - Jianhui Liu
PY  - 2013/10
DA  - 2013/10
TI  - Scientific Incentive Mechanism of College English Teachers
BT  - Proceedings of the 2013 International Academic Workshop on Social Science
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 697
EP  - 700
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.154
DO  - 10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.154
ID  - Zhang2013/10
ER  -