Evolutionary game analysis of enterprise R&D decision-making in the production and learning alliance

DOI

10.2991/hsmet-18.2018.34How to use a DOI?

Keywords

alliance of academy-industry; Evolutionary game; Cooperative strategy

Abstract

In this paper, the evolution game model is used to investigate the difference of the profit and game strategies of the cooperative innovation of enterprises participating in the cooperative innovation of enterprises under the constraints of enterprise cooperation and non-cooperation (competition). Results indicate that Under the constraint of inter-enterprise cooperative strategy, there are two steady-state convergent equilibrium points. The direction of strategy convergence depends on the net gain of cooperative innovation. Under the constraint of non-cooperative strategy between enterprises, whether the enterprise chooses to participate or not participate fully depends on whether the net income can be obtained under the participation strategy. At the same time, both the increase of gain and the decrease of cost can increase the probability of participation strategy selection. Further, the above analysis shows that the government's policy of stimulating enterprises to participate in the collaborative innovation of production through direct and indirect financial subsidies is reasonable. However, the incentive effect of government subsidy under non-cooperative constraint can realize the existence threshold.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Yan Wang
PY  - 2018/06
DA  - 2018/06
TI  - Evolutionary game analysis of enterprise R&D decision-making in the production and learning alliance
BT  - Proceedings of the 2018 3rd International Conference on Humanities Science, Management and Education Technology (HSMET 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 179
EP  - 188
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/hsmet-18.2018.34
DO  - 10.2991/hsmet-18.2018.34
ID  - Wang2018/06
ER  -