Study on the Green Construction Supervision Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

DOI

10.2991/emcm-16.2017.199How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Green construction; Evolutionary game; System stability; Regulatory strategy

Abstract

Under the green construction policy, this paper analyzes the game relationship between construction enterprise and supervision department, and sets up a green construction supervision evolutionary game model based on the replicated dynamic equation. By means of Jacobin matrix and other nonlinear system analysis methods, the stability of the equilibrium point of the game system is studied, and the factors that affect the level of green construction are analyzed. The result shows that there is no stable equilibrium in the static game system. After the supervision department takes the dynamic penalty strategy, the game system has an evolutionary stable equilibrium point. Improving the punishment and reward of the regulatory authorities or reducing regulatory costs, can effectively improve the level of green construction.

Copyright

© 2017, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Zhongfu Qin
AU  - Wei Wei
AU  - Min Qin
PY  - 2017/02
DA  - 2017/02
TI  - Study on the Green Construction Supervision Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
BT  - Proceedings of the 2016 7th International Conference on Education, Management, Computer and Medicine (EMCM 2016)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/emcm-16.2017.199
DO  - 10.2991/emcm-16.2017.199
ID  - Qin2017/02
ER  -