Proceedings of the International Conference on Electronics, Mechanics, Culture and Medicine

Game Analysis on Lowering Price Maliciously between Farmers and Grain Merchants under the Background of Repayment Pressure

Authors
Dehua Zhang
Corresponding Author
Dehua Zhang
Available Online February 2016.
DOI
10.2991/emcm-15.2016.32How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Lower price; Farmers; Grain merchants; Competition mechanism; Storage costs
Abstract

In remote areas, grain sales of the farmers depend on the grain merchants. In the process of the sales, the grain merchants will lower the price which plays a direct role in farmers’ grain income and restricts the grain production enthusiasm of farmers. The paper analyzes the game behaviors between farmers and grain merchants using complete information dynamic game model, then comes to the conclusion that competition mechanism and storage costs have a direct impact on the behaviors between farmers and grain merchants.

Copyright
© 2016, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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Volume Title
Proceedings of the International Conference on Electronics, Mechanics, Culture and Medicine
Series
Advances in Computer Science Research
Publication Date
February 2016
ISBN
10.2991/emcm-15.2016.32
ISSN
2352-538X
DOI
10.2991/emcm-15.2016.32How to use a DOI?
Copyright
© 2016, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Dehua Zhang
PY  - 2016/02
DA  - 2016/02
TI  - Game Analysis on Lowering Price Maliciously between Farmers and Grain Merchants under the Background of Repayment Pressure
BT  - Proceedings of the International Conference on Electronics, Mechanics, Culture and Medicine
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 172
EP  - 177
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/emcm-15.2016.32
DO  - 10.2991/emcm-15.2016.32
ID  - Zhang2016/02
ER  -