Research on Cooperative Strategy of Clean Energy Grid-connected Subjects based on Evolutionary Game Model
- https://doi.org/10.2991/edmi-19.2019.1How to use a DOI?
- Evolutionary game theory, evolutionary biology theory, clean energy power generation enterprises, complex braking dynamic equation, dynamic evolutionary phase diagram.
Evolutionary game theory, based on the assumption of bounded rationality of individuals and taking group behavior as the research object, is the result of integrating evolutionary biology theory into classical game theory. Based on the complex braking dynamic equation between clean energy power generation enterprises and power grid enterprises, the coordinates of unstable equilibrium points and saddle points in the evolutionary system are calculated, and the dynamic evolutionary phase diagram of the game system is formed. According to the variation of system evolutionary behavior parameters, the model further differentiates into five evolutionary results in the strategy set (cooperation, non-cooperation) of two players. The results show that the long-term evolutionary equilibrium results of the two sides are completely cooperative or completely non-cooperative, depending on the relation of inequality of the area above and below the critical line of the dynamic evolutionary phase diagram.
- © 2019, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Fengkai Qiu AU - Yan Yang AU - Jiaxin Zhao AU - Xiaochun Zhang AU - Ming Zeng AU - Yongli Wang AU - Chenjun Sun PY - 2019/08 DA - 2019/08 TI - Research on Cooperative Strategy of Clean Energy Grid-connected Subjects based on Evolutionary Game Model BT - Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Economic Development and Management Innovation (EDMI 2019) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 1 EP - 5 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/edmi-19.2019.1 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/edmi-19.2019.1 ID - Qiu2019/08 ER -