The Simulation of Oligopoly Information Equilibria with Agents' Capacity Constraints
Available Online February 2019.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/cmdm-18.2019.2How to use a DOI?
- stackelberg oligopoly, reflexion, capacity constraint
- The game model of the oligopoly under the linear demand function and the non-linear functions of agents’ costs is considered, taking into account the capacity constraints of the agents. The simulation of optimal strategies for unlimited agents is carried out. The Pareto-efficient information equilibria of the game are found under various reflective assumptions of the agents.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Mikhail Geras'kin PY - 2019/02 DA - 2019/02 TI - The Simulation of Oligopoly Information Equilibria with Agents' Capacity Constraints BT - Third Workshop on Computer Modelling in Decision Making (CMDM 2018) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 7 EP - 12 SN - 2352-538X UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/cmdm-18.2019.2 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/cmdm-18.2019.2 ID - Geras'kin2019/02 ER -