Proceedings of the Third Workshop on Computer Modelling in Decision Making (CMDM 2018)

The Simulation of Oligopoly Information Equilibria with Agents' Capacity Constraints

Authors
Mikhail Geras'kin
Corresponding Author
Mikhail Geras'kin
Available Online February 2019.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/cmdm-18.2019.2How to use a DOI?
Keywords
stackelberg oligopoly, reflexion, capacity constraint
Abstract
The game model of the oligopoly under the linear demand function and the non-linear functions of agents’ costs is considered, taking into account the capacity constraints of the agents. The simulation of optimal strategies for unlimited agents is carried out. The Pareto-efficient information equilibria of the game are found under various reflective assumptions of the agents.
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Proceedings
Third Workshop on Computer Modelling in Decision Making (CMDM 2018)
Part of series
Advances in Computer Science Research
Publication Date
February 2019
ISBN
978-94-6252-674-7
ISSN
2352-538X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/cmdm-18.2019.2How to use a DOI?
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Mikhail Geras'kin
PY  - 2019/02
DA  - 2019/02
TI  - The Simulation of Oligopoly Information Equilibria with Agents' Capacity Constraints
BT  - Third Workshop on Computer Modelling in Decision Making (CMDM 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 7
EP  - 12
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/cmdm-18.2019.2
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2991/cmdm-18.2019.2
ID  - Geras'kin2019/02
ER  -