The Simulation of Oligopoly Information Equilibria with Agents' Capacity Constraints

DOI

10.2991/cmdm-18.2019.2How to use a DOI?

Keywords

stackelberg oligopoly, reflexion, capacity constraint

Abstract

The game model of the oligopoly under the linear demand function and the non-linear functions of agents’ costs is considered, taking into account the capacity constraints of the agents. The simulation of optimal strategies for unlimited agents is carried out. The Pareto-efficient information equilibria of the game are found under various reflective assumptions of the agents.

Copyright

© 2019, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Mikhail Geras'kin
PY  - 2019/02
DA  - 2019/02
TI  - The Simulation of Oligopoly Information Equilibria with Agents' Capacity Constraints
BT  - Proceedings of the Third Workshop on Computer Modelling in Decision Making (CMDM 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 7
EP  - 12
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/cmdm-18.2019.2
DO  - 10.2991/cmdm-18.2019.2
ID  - Geras'kin2019/02
ER  -