Volume 8, Issue 2, April 2015, Pages 307 - 316
A Further Research on S-core for Interval Cooperative Games
Dengyuan Xie, Fei Guan, Qiang Zhang
Received 25 June 2014, Accepted 22 October 2014, Available Online 1 April 2015.
- https://doi.org/10.1080/18756891.2015.1001953How to use a DOI?
- Interval cooperative game, S-core, balanced collection, minimal weak balanced interval cooperative game
- Interval cooperative game is a kind of model focusing on how to distribute the profit reasonably when payoffs of any alliance are interval numbers. In recent years, the existence and reasonableness of its solution have aroused widespread concern. In this paper, based on the conceptual analyses of various solutions of interval cooperative games, S-core is further researched. The concepts of weak balanced interval cooperative games and minimal weak balanced interval cooperative games are firstly proposed. The necessary and sufficient condition which guarantees S-core is nonempty is proven, furthermore, the inequalities can be simplified on the condition that the left endpoints of interval numbers satisfy the superadditivity. Then this paper analyzes the whole solution space of S-core and the solution method of S-core is converted into the method solving a linear programming problem. After that the concept of S-dominance core is put forward and the equivalent conditions of S-core and S-dominance core are proved. Finally, the reasonableness and validity of S-core are verified through a specific example.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - JOUR AU - Dengyuan Xie AU - Fei Guan AU - Qiang Zhang PY - 2015 DA - 2015/04/01 TI - A Further Research on S-core for Interval Cooperative Games JO - International Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems SP - 307 EP - 316 VL - 8 IS - 2 SN - 1875-6883 UR - https://doi.org/10.1080/18756891.2015.1001953 DO - https://doi.org/10.1080/18756891.2015.1001953 ID - Xie2015 ER -